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INTRODUCTION
“[H]ad Loginovskaya resided on Main Street, U.S.A. or Sutton
Place, New York rather than in Surgut, Russia at the time she
made her investments, we all agree that her suit would have
been allowed to proceed[.]”1

Every single day, individual investors are defrauded in the
derivatives marketplace. Should an individual be able to pursue
a claim against the fraudster? Absolutely. Unfortunately,
confusion has diluted this seemingly obvious “yes” over time,
ultimately barring individuals like Ludmila Loginovskaya, a
Russian citizen, from pursuing a cause of action in the Southern
District of New York against a domestic commodity broker.
Derivative markets have existed for centuries, but were not
widely followed until the late 2000s. In the early 1930s, the
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) was enacted to regulate
commodities, such as wheat, corn, and potatoes, and other
agricultural futures contracts.2 These are the products that
continue to come to mind for most people when they think about
what the Act must regulate today. However, the derivatives
marketplace has expanded vastly and rapidly over time, and the
Act also regulates major financial instruments, including credit,
currency, and interest rate swaps.

†
Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2018, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2014, University of Delaware.
1
Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko (Loginovskaya II), 764 F.3d 266, 276 (2d Cir.
2014) (Lohier, J., dissenting).
2
History of the CFTC: US Futures Trading and Regulation Before the Creation
of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/Ab
out/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_precftc (last visited Dec. 23, 2017).
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It was not until the Financial Crisis of 2008 that individuals,
governments, and industry experts alike realized the magnitude
and significance of the derivatives market and the damage that
could be done if it was not responsibly regulated. While the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) closed many of these
market loopholes, questions remain regarding the extent to
which extraterritorial jurisdiction exists over claims related to
commodities and other derivative products that are subject to the
CEA, and who is permitted to assert such a claim.
This Note argues that courts should return to using a holistic
approach, similar to the traditional “conducts” and “effects” test
previously used by courts to analyze extraterritorial securities
and commodities claims, to assess claims brought under the
CEA. Furthermore, this Note argues that both the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission and private individuals including
foreign plaintiffs, should be permitted to bring these claims to
uphold Congress’s intent in establishing a regulatory regime and
maintaining the integrity of the international derivatives
market. Part I discusses the history of derivative regulation and
how both court decisions and statutory changes have created the
potential for confusion when asserting causes of action in the
commodities context. Fueling this confusion, one Supreme Court
case in particular, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,
held that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
applicable in Rule 10b-5 cases, and eliminated the used of the
“conducts” and “effects” test to assess these extraterritorial
claims. Part II uses recent case law, specifically a case out of the
Second Circuit, Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, to illustrate the
problems and inconsistencies with extending the Morrison
decision to commodity and derivative fraud claims under the
CEA in a post-Dodd-Frank world. Part III.A argues that courts
should return to using a holistic, fact-specific approach, rather
than
Morrison’s
transactional
test,
when
evaluating
extraterritorial jurisdiction in commodity and derivative fraud
cases. Part III.B argues that, consistent with the use of a holistic
test outlined in Part III.A, foreign plaintiffs should continue to be
afforded private rights of action for commodity and derivative
fraud or manipulation suits in U.S. courts. Lastly, Part III.C
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addresses the steps that courts must take to correct or address
policy misstatements when presented with these claims in the
future.
I.

THE EVOLVING REGULATION OF THE DERIVATIVES
MARKETPLACE AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
CEA
A.

Understanding Derivatives and Their Role in the 2008
Financial Crisis

A derivative is a contract between two parties whose value is
derived from an asset’s underlying price and performance.3 “The
value of derivatives is derived from the performance of an asset,
index, interest rate, commodity or currency.”4 Derivatives have
existed since ancient times,5 and can be broken down into four
major categories: forwards, futures, options, and swaps.6 Swaps
come in many varieties, but since the passage of Dodd-Frank in
2010, swaps have been more specifically defined in both the CEA
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7 As currently defined
in the CEA, a swap could be any transaction that is not settled by
delivery of the underlying commodity, including, but not limited
to (1) options, such as puts, calls, caps, and floors on most
reference assets; (2) swaps, such as those on interest rates,
broad-based securities indices, and other reference assets;
(3) credit default swaps; (4) any other instrument “that is
or . . . becomes commonly known . . . as a swap”; (5) foreign

3
Steven Nickolas, What Is the Difference Between Derivatives and Swaps?,
INVESTOPEDIA (June 2, 2015, 1:21 PM), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/0
60215/what-difference-between-derivatives-and-swaps.asp.
4
Id. (emphasis added).
5
GARY E. KALBAUGH, DERIVATIVES LAW AND REGULATION 25 (2014) (“ ‘There is
the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device . . . . According to the
story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a
great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits
for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price
because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and many were
wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased,
and made a quantity of money. . . .’ Thales, by buying the future right to the use the
olive presses, entered into an economic derivative, a futures contract.” (quoting
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, BOOK 1)).
6
HECTOR COLON, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, THE ROLE OF DERIVATIVES
IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (2016), http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib187.pdf.
7
See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2012).

FINAL_SCHWARTZ

772

3/25/2018 7:03 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:769

exchange swaps and foreign exchange forward contracts; and
(6) any instrument that combines any of the above.8 The
definition of swap excludes futures and most forward contracts.
Until 2010, the swaps market was “completely lacking in
transparency, and virtually unregulated,” as described by former
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox.9 Major financial institutions
“were using credit default swaps . . . as a means of ‘insuring’
against some of their overly risky subprime business practices.”10
Swaps, like securities and other derivative products, have
generally been traded in “over-the-counter” (“OTC”) markets.11
OTC derivatives are traded by large financial institutions,
traditionally banks, holding companies and investment banks,
which act as derivatives dealers, buying and selling contracts
with customers.12 Unlike the futures, options and national
securities exchanges, the OTC market is neither centralized nor
regulated, nor is it transparent, and thus price discovery is
limited.13 OTC markets let derivatives traders, including the
large investment banks, increase their leverage—a double-edged
sword in terms of risk and reward.14 “While up until the mid2000s, derivatives were ‘generally regarded as a beneficial
financial innovation that distributed financial risk more
efficiently and made the financial system more stable, resilient,
and resistant to shock . . . [t]he [financial] crisis essentially

8
See id.; see also Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP to Clients
on CFTC and SEC Adopt Definition of “Swap” and “Security-Based Swap” 5 (Aug.
23, 2012), http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2012/08/CFTC%20and
%20SEC%20Adopt%20Definition%20of%20Swap%20and%20Securi__/Files/CFTCan
dSECAdoptDefinitionofSwap1pdfFileAttachment/CFTC_and_SEC_Adopt_Definition
_of_Swap1.pdf.
9
Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at SEC
Roundtable on Modernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission's Disclosure
System (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch100808cc.htm.
10
See Jonathan Lindenfeld, The CFTC’s Substituted Compliance Approach: An
Attempt To Bring About Global Harmony and Stability in the Derivatives Market, 14
J. INT’L BUS. & L. 125, 127 (2015).
11
See id. at 128.
12
Id. at 128–29.
13
Id.
14
THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stan
ford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
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reversed this view.’ ”15 In the aftermath of the 2008 Financial
Crisis, Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee (“FCIC”),
a ten-member, government-appointed committee tasked with
investigating the cause of the financial crisis, that credit default
swaps created problems during the financial crisis.16
Furthermore, Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers stated
to the FCIC that “while risks could not necessarily have been
foreseen years ago, ‘by 2008 our regulatory framework with
respect to derivatives was manifestly inadequate’ and that ‘the
derivatives that proved to be by far the most serious, those
associated with credit default swaps, increased 100 fold between
2000 and 2008.’ ”17 However, this increase was built on a faulty
presumption of success. While the worldwide value of the
underlying assets for credit default swaps grew to $58.2 trillion
at the end of 2007, “[a] significant portion was . . . speculative or
naked credit default swaps.”18 In the aftermath of the crisis, it
was easy to see that derivatives helped create a perfect storm for
systematic failure.19
B.

Dodd-Frank Changes the CEA by Adding Provisions That
Specifically Address the Extent of the CFTC’s Jurisdiction
over Extraterritorial Activities

In order to patch market loopholes and address the greatest
financial collapse in modern history, Congress enacted DoddFrank “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system.”20 More specifically, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act,
15

Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass'n v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385–86 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 891 F. Supp. 2d 162, 173 (D.D.C. 2012).
16
THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 14, at 48–49.
17
Id. at 49.
18
Id. at 50.
19
See id. at 51; id. at 352 (“AIG’s failure was possible because of the sweeping
deregulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, including credit default swaps,
which effectively eliminated federal and state regulation of these products, including
capital and margin requirements that would have lessened the likelihood of AIG’s
failure. The OTC derivatives market’s lack of transparency and of effective price
discovery exacerbated the collateral disputes of AIG and Goldman Sachs and similar
disputes between other derivatives counterparties.”).
20
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
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known as the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act
of 2010,21 imposed a comprehensive and far-reaching regulatory
regime on derivatives and market participants and mandated the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to engage in new
rulemaking.22 Under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC was tasked with
implementing four goals: “(1) clearing of standardized swaps
through central counterparties or clearinghouses; (2) trading of
swaps on transparent, regulated platforms; (3) oversight of swap
dealers and major swap participants; and (4) reporting of data on
the swaps market to facilitate greater transparency and enhance
regulatory oversight.”23
To address and achieve these goals, § 722 of Dodd-Frank
explicitly granted jurisdiction over swaps to the CFTC,24 and also
created a new § 2(i) of the CEA, which states that provisions of
Dodd-Frank “shall not apply to activities outside the United
States unless those activities have a direct and significant
connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United
States . . . .”25
The CEA has several different provisions that address
jurisdiction and govern who may bring a cause of action. “The
CEA is a ‘remedial statute that serves the crucial purpose of
protecting the innocent individual investor—who may know little
about the intricacies and complexities of the commodities
market—from being misled or deceived.’ ”26 Section 2 of the CEA
confers exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC, but does not
“supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the
United States . . . .”27 The Act also affords rights to individuals.

21

Id. at 1641 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8301 (2012)).
MORRISON & FOERSTER, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: A CHEAT SHEET 3 (2010),
http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf.
23
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: FISCAL
YEAR 2017, at 2 (2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents
/file/cftcbudget2017.pdf.
24
See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2012); see also Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 722(a)(2) (2012) (reserving
jurisdiction over “security-based swaps” for the SEC).
25
7 U.S.C.A § 2(i)(1)–(2) (West 2015).
26
Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir.
2002)).
27
7 U.S.C.A § 2(a)(1)(A) (West 2015).
22
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Section 25 affords a private right of action to individuals,28 and in
addition to bringing a cause of action in court, “[a]n aggrieved
party otherwise may seek recovery through an administrative
proceeding at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.”29
However, the sheer magnitude and expanse of the OTC
derivatives market means that identifying, regulating, and
policing all trades is virtually impossible, making the need for
private rights of action readily apparent. While the CEA is said
to afford rights to both the agency and the individual against a
defendant broker, how are courts to determine whether there is
proper jurisdiction over the claim itself, particularly if the alleged
fraud took place outside of the United States or if the aggrieved
party is not a U.S. citizen?
C.

Methods for Assessing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over
Commodity Fraud Claims

1.

“Conducts” and “Effects” Test

For decades, courts used a fact-specific “conducts” and
“effects” test to assess the extraterritorial applicability of the
CEA.30 For example, in Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.,31 the
Second Circuit held that the Southern District had subject
matter jurisdiction to hear a CEA claim brought by a Greek
citizen and resident against a U.S. commodity broker, even
though the transaction was executed through the defendant’s
Athens office.32 The court noted:
The conduct test does not center its inquiry on whether
domestic investors or markets are affected, but on the nature of
the conduct within the United States as it relates to carrying
out the alleged fraudulent scheme, on the theory that Congress
did not want ‘to allow the United States to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even
when these are peddled only to foreigners.’33

28
29
30
31
32
33

See id. § 25(a)(1) (2012).
Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 270 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)).
See KALBAUGH, supra note 5, at 451.
722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1045 (quoting ITT v. Vencamp, Ltd. 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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Similarly, in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L.,34 the
Seventh Circuit held that the District Court correctly applied the
conduct and effects test to determine that it had “subject matter
jurisdiction . . . over a cause of action arising from trading on
United States exchanges, even though the parties were
nonresident aliens and contacts between them occurred in a
foreign country.”35 However, in 2010, one month before DoddFrank’s enactment, the United States Supreme Court decided
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.36 and announced a new
“transactional test” to define the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.37
2.

Morrison and the “Transactional Test”

In Morrison, the Court held that § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“’34 Exchange Act”) did not have
extaterritorial reach because there was no affirmative indication
in the ’34 Exchange Act that this Section should apply
extraterritorially.38 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia—
known for his black-and-white textualist methods of
interpretation—stated that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,”39 giving
deference to earlier precedent and canons of statutory
interpretation.40
However, as importantly noted by Justice Stevens in his
concurring opinion, “while the clarity and simplicity of [a
transactional test] may have some salutary consequences, like all
bright-line rules it also has drawbacks.”41 Primarily, the Court
did not directly address what happens when a statute includes “a
34

730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1105–06, 1108; see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206
(2d Cir. 1968) (“We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have
purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic
securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American
securities.” (emphasis added)).
36
561 U.S. 247 (2010).
37
Id. at 274 (Stevens, J., concurring).
38
Id. at 255 (majority opinion).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 255 (“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” ’ ” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))).
41
Id. at 285 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35
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clear statement of extraterritorial effect”42 and conceded that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is not a “clear statement
rule” that requires a statute to explicitly say “this law applies
abroad.”43 As a result, courts have failed to read past the
straightforward language of the transactional test and have
begun to erroneously extend Morrison in contexts that a brightline test is not suited for, namely in fraud cases that fall under
the CEA.44
Most importantly, as highlighted in Part II of this Note, “[a]n
additional complicating factor is that Morrison was decided
before Dodd-Frank.”45
Morrison implicitly held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to all laws that
are silent on extraterritorial application, and therefore there are
two clear issues here. First, the applicability of the transactional
test outside of § 10(b) is not self-evident, and second, the CEA is
not silent on extraterritorial application, as explicitly amended
by Dodd-Frank less than one month after Morrison was decided.
D. Morrison and Dodd-Frank Fail to Clarify Who May Bring a
Claim
In light of essentially overlapping and potentially
contradictory judicial and legislative activity trying to address
issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it has become increasingly
unclear what causes of actions U.S. courts have jurisdiction to
hear based on (1) the type of financial instrument used to
defraud a purchaser; (2) who is permitted to bring a claim—an
individual plaintiff exercising a private right of action or only the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission; (3) the domestic
versus international nature of the events giving rise to the claim;
and (4) which test the court should apply in evaluating the claim.
Despite its attempt to be clear and concise, Morrison has not
been received as clear, black-letter law governing securities
claims. In fact, in the securities regulation and litigation context,
there have been inconsistent results interpreting and applying
42
Id. at 264–65 (majority opinion) (comparing § 30(a) of the Act with § 10(b),
§ 30(a) “contains what § 10(b) lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial
effect. . . . No one claims that § 30(a) applies here”).
43
Id. at 265 (“Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”).
44
See, e.g., Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussed infra, Part
II).
45
VED P. NANDA ET AL., 2 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S.
COURTS § 8:34 (2d ed. 2017).
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Morrison, causing confusion and disagreement among courts
across the nation.46 If courts have not been able to properly use
the Morrison test in its intended field, it should not come as a
surprise that this decision has led to widespread confusion in the
commodities context as well.
Therefore, this Note proposes a three-part solution. Part
III.A argues that courts should return to using a holistic, factspecific approach, rather than Morrison’s transactional test, in
evaluating extraterritorial jurisdiction over derivatives cases.
Part III.B argues that, consistent with the use of a holistic test
outlined in Part III.A, foreign plaintiffs should continue to be
afforded the right to bring a cause of action for derivative fraud
or manipulation suits in U.S. courts. Lastly, Part III.C addresses
the steps that courts must take to correct erroneous
misstatements to avoid a flawed line of policy and precedent
moving forward. However, before turning to these solutions,
Part II provides in-depth illustration of the problem at hand by
examining the the Second Circuit decision in Loginovskaya v.
Batratchenko.
II. THE MORRISON TEST FALLS SHORT IN A DERIVATIVES
CONTEXT
A.

The Loginovskaya Decision: The Perfect Storm for
Extraterritorial Confusion

In Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko,47 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that that private fraud
claims under the CEA may only proceed if the alleged fraudulent

46
See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 527
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Though the Supreme Court purported to lay out a bright-line rule
regarding the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b), Morrison's impact on this
case is far from clear.”); Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677
F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (“While Morrison holds that § 10(b) can be applied to
domestic purchases or sales, it provides little guidance as to what constitutes a
domestic purchase or sale.”); see also Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp.
2d 620, 623–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); SEC v. Chicago Convention Ctr., LLC., 961 F. Supp.
2d 905, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
47
764 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2014).
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commodities transaction was within the United States, even
though the defendant corporation was domiciled in the United
States and the alleged fraud took place in the United States.48
In Loginovskaya, the Thor Group (“Thor”), “an international
financial services organization based in New York,” managed
investment programs in commodity futures and real estate.49
Several Thor entities were registered participants in the
commodities markets as commodity pool operators or commodity
trading investors.50 The defendant, Oleg Batratchenko, a U.S.
citizen residing in Moscow, was Thor’s chief executive officer,
while the plaintiff, “[Ludmila] Loginovskaya, a Russian citizen
residing in Russia, was solicited by Batratchenko in 2006 to
invest in Thor’s programs.”51 Loginovskaya entered into two
investment contracts with Thor in 2006 and 2007 and
transferred a total of $720,000 for these contracts to Thor’s bank
accounts located in New York.52
In 2010, Batratchenko sent a letter to Loginovskaya falsely
stating that “due to onerous new regulations in the United
States, investors could not withdraw their funds from the
investment
accounts
without
providing
burdensome
53
documentation.”
Loginovskaya later learned that Thor used
invested client funds to extend $40 million in unsecure loans to
Atlant Capital Holdings LLC, an undercapitalized real estate
investment firm in which Batratchenko had personal financial
interests.54 Ultimately, the loans defaulted and Batratcthenko
was unable to recover Loginovskaya’s funds.55

48
OWEN C. PELL & SCOTT E. HERSHMAN, WHITE AND CASE, CLIENT ALERT,
LOGINOVSKAYA V. BATRATCHENKO: THE SECOND CIRCUIT LIMITS THE REACH OF
COMMODITIES FRAUD CLAIMS 1 (Sept. 2014), http://www.whitecase.com/sites/whiteca
se/files/files/download/publications/wc-alert-the-second-circuit-limits-the-reach-ofcommodities-fraud-claims.pdf.
49
Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 268.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 268–69.
53
Id. at 269.
54
Id.
55
Id.
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Loginovskaya sued under CEA § 25, which provides a
plaintiff with a private cause of action under the Act,56 and § 4o,
one of the CEA’s several antifraud provisions.57 The Southern
District dismissed Loginovskaya’s claim, extending Morrison to
CEA claims and held that the CEA’s antifraud provision did not
apply extraterritorially.58
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the Southern
District.59 In reaching its decision, the court stated that “[t]he
CEA as a whole—and sections 4o and 22 in particular—is silent
as to extraterritorial reach,” and therefore applied Morrison’s
presumption against extraterritoriality.60 The court reasoned
that “the CEA creates a private right of action for persons
anywhere in the world who transact business in the United
States, and does not open our courts to people who choose to do
business elsewhere.”61 The court stopped its analysis at § 22 and
did not proceed to analyze Loginovskaya’s § 4o claim.
In a vigorous and well-executed dissent, Judge Lohier
argued that Loginovskaya sufficiently alleged a violation of and
satisfied the territoriality requirement under § 4o and identified
several inconsistencies in the majority’s analysis.62 In part, he
states:
In other words, had Loginovskaya resided on Main Street,
U.S.A. or Sutton Place, New York rather than in Surgut, Russia
at the time she made her investments, we all agree that her suit
would have been allowed to proceed: a large part of the
defendants’ scheme transpired in the United States, involved
United States actors regulated by the CEA, and was premised
on false promises to invest Loginovskaya’s money in
commodities markets in the United States, in violation of
§ 4o. . . . Instead, the majority opinion affords an extra,
56

See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (2012).
Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko (Loginovskaya I), 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
58
Id. at 366 (“[I]n order for the CEA to be applicable, the implicated fraud
prohibited by the statute must be domestic. In a post-Morrison universe, however,
determining whether actionable conduct falling within a given statute is domestic in
nature presents complications for provisions whose language departs from that of
§ 10(b).”).
59
Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 275.
60
Id. at 271.
61
Id. at 273. In the wake of the Loginovskaya II decision, the CFTC asserted
that this statement, given Dodd-Frank’s changed to the CEA, is factually incorrect.
See infra note 68.
62
Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 276 (Lohier, J., dissenting).
57
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unfounded layer of protection to the defendants by applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality and the Morrison
transaction test to § 22 of the CEA . . . . Under the rule
announced today, private victims of commodities fraud will be
required to allege a separate domestic commodities transaction
even if they adequately plead a violation of § 4o, which does not
require such a transaction. In fashioning this new rule, the
majority misunderstands both the commodities laws of the
United States and the presumption of extraterritoriality.63

Additionally, Judge Lohier explained why Morrison’s
transaction test does not apply to § 4o and, most importantly,
reflected on the purpose and intent of the CEA: to “ ‘protect all
market participants from fraudulent or other abusive sales
practices and misuses of customer assets’ and to preserve the
integrity of the United States commodities markets.”64
As highlighted by Judge Lohier, there are two major
problems with the court’s Loginovskaya analysis. First, as noted
by the Southern District and the dissent in this case, it is not
entirely clear that the Supreme Court intended Morrison to
apply outside of the securities context, let alone to commodity
claims.65 Second, the court chose to apply Morrison after
interpreting the CEA to be silent with regard to
extraterritoriality.66 However, as the text of the CEA has read
since July 2010, this is not the case: § 2(i) discusses the
extraterritorial application of the Act.67

63
Id. at 276–77; see also id. at 279 (“I share the majority’s optimism that the
CFTC can effectively police bad behavior. Having announced, however, that ‘the
CEA creates a private right of action for persons anywhere in the world who
transact business in the United States, and does not open our courts to people who
choose to do business elsewhere,’ the majority cannot have it both ways.” (citation
omitted)).
64
Id. at 280 (emphasis in original) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2012)).
65
Loginovskaya I, 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). (“[T]he
appropriateness of extending Morrison’s transaction test to CEA claims under § 4o is
not immediately clear.”).
66
See supra note 60.
67
7 U.S.C.A § 2(i)(1)–(2) (West 2015).
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The CFTC Rejects the Second Circuit’s Reading of the CEA

Days after the Loginovskaya opinion was published, the
CFTC wrote to the Second Circuit requesting the correction of
“certain erroneous statements about the CEA.”68 Specifically, the
CFTC wrote, “the Court stated incorrectly that the CEA is ‘silent’
with respect to its extraterritorial application” in Section II of the
majority opinion.69 The CFTC continued, “[b]ased on the facts as
described in the opinion, it appears that the Court intended to
address the CEA as it existed prior to July 2010 . . . when
Congress overhauled the statute in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.”70 In contrast, “when
Congress amended the CEA in Dodd-Frank, it specified that the
CEA does apply overseas to swaps activity with a sufficient
nexus to U.S. commerce” and therefore, because “the private
right of action provision under CEA Section 22, 7 U.S.C. § 25,
was amended by Dodd-Frank to include references to swaps
activities, [it is] covered by Section 2(i),” and the court’s
“statement that the CEA is ‘silent as to extraterritorial reach’
and related statements on the intent of Congress
are . . . incorrect.”71
The CFTC concluded by requesting that the Court amend its
opinion to clarify which version of the CEA it is referring to for
the relevant time period in question.72 Most importantly, the
CFTC’s letter addressed the heart of its issue with the Second
Circuit’s incorrect application of the law:
Given the Second Circuit’s preeminence in the field of financial
regulation, the error regarding the CEA’s current overseas
applicability may be cited by other courts and litigants to create
a flawed line of precedent that could hamper the Commission’s
enforcement and regulatory efforts in the future, [and] [a]t a
minimum, this incorrect language is likely to sow confusion.73

Despite the CFTC’s efforts, the Loginovskaya opinion
remains unchanged.

68
Letter on behalf of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, requesting
a change to be made to the Opinion Filed at 1, Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764
F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-01624) 2014 BL 245952.
69
Id.
70
Id. (internal citations omitted).
71
Id. at 2.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 3.
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Loginovskaya’s Lingering Effects Reveal Inconsistent Case
Law Across the Country

The CFTC accurately predicted that the Second Circuit’s
failure to correct the statements in its opinion would create a
flawed line of precedent. Since 2014, many opinions that have
come out of the Southern District of New York have relied on the
Court’s analysis in Loginovskaya to interpret the CEA and, in
several cases, have led the Court to conclude that the Act does
not have extraterritorial reach.74
However, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida recently accepted the opposing argument. In
US Commodity Futures Exchange Commission v. Vision
Financial Partners, LLC,75 the defendant, Vision Financial,
operating from Florida, recruited individuals to invest in binary
options traded through three foreign platforms: one located in
Israel, one located in Cyprus, and one located in the United
Kingdom.76 Vision Financial did not invest the majority of the
funds received; instead, its key director, Neil Pecker, used these
funds to pay for his personal expenses.77 The defendant claimed
that the CEA “does not extend the Commission’s authority to
binary options” and that the court would lack jurisdiction over
such a matter “because [the options] were purchased by foreign
investors and exchanged on foreign trading platforms.”78 The
74
See, e.g., MBC Fin. Servs. v. Boston Merch. Fin, LLC, 15-cv-00275 (DAB),
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140195, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2016) (holding that the
plaintiff’s CEA claim could not survive a motion to dismiss because the “[p]laintiff
[did] not demonstrate that any title of a commodity or swap was transferred within
the United States, or that either party incurred irrevocable liability within the
United States to pay or deliver a swap”); In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates
Antitrust Litig., 13 Civ. 7789 (LGS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128237, at *93 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 20, 2016) (determining that the CEA does not apply extraterritorially to
foreign exchange claims because “[i]n Loginovskaya, the Second Circuit held that
because ‘the CEA as a whole is silent as to extraterritorial reach,’ courts must
‘presume it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions’ ” (internal alterations
omitted) (quoting Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2014))); Sullivan v.
Barclays Plc, 13-cv-2811 (PKC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25756, at *87–88 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 2017); In re Platinum and Palladium Antitrust Litig., 1:14-cv-9391-GHW,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46624, at *84–87 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017); Wah v. HSBC N.
Am. Holdings, Inc., 15 Civ. 8974 (LGS) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86107, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
June 5, 2017); In re North Sea Brent Crude Oil Futures Litig., 13-md-02475 (ALC),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88246, at *26–28 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2017).
75
190 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
76
Id. at 1128.
77
Id. at 1129.
78
Id. at 1130.
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court declined to accept either of these arguments, and stated
that “[t]he Commodity Exchange Act . . . does contain an
affirmative indication that it applies to extraterritorial
transactions . . . .”79
There are two key differences between Loginovskaya and
Vision Financial that those in support of the Loginovskaya
decision might point out. First, Loginovskaya deals with a
plaintiff seeking to exercise a private right of action, whereas
Vision Financial deals with the Commission bringing a suit.80
Morrison is designed to limit the former, not the latter, and
§ 13a-1 explicitly grants jurisdiction to the Commission to sue for
a “violation of any provision of [the Commodity Exchange Act].”81
Second, in Loginovskaya, the victim was defrauded through
investment in a swap, whereas in Vision Financial, the victims
were defrauded through investment in binary options.82 While it
may seem that either of these differences could be a “smoking
gun” to solidify a motion to dismiss, this is not the case.
Using a factually-focused, holistic approach, partnered with
a close reading of the post-Dodd-Frank CEA, it is evident that
despite the cross-border nature of the facts, both Loginovskaya
and the CFTC should be permitted to assert their claims. The
same way that § 13a-1 permits the CFTC to assert a claim with
regard to any violation of the Act, including instruments
commonly known to the trade such as binary options, § 22 and
§ (2)(i), read together, should permit Ludmila Loginovskaya to
assert her claim for fraudulent swap activity.83
Therefore, to ensure consistency, predictability, and stability
within the law and international commodity markets, three
different things need to happen. First, courts need to return to a
holistic approach in evaluating extraterritorial claims that are
subject to the CEA. Second, using this holistic approach, courts
79

Id. at 1131 (emphasis in original).
Compare Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 2013), with Vision
Financial, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1127.
81
See Vision Financial, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1129; see also 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1
(2012).
82
Compare Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 268–69, with Vision Financial, 190 F.
Supp. 3d at 1128.
83
See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (2012) (“[T]he Commission may bring an action . . . to
enforce compliance with this chapter, or any rule, regulation or order thereunder,
and said courts shall have jurisdiction to entertain such actions.”); see also
7 U.S.C. § 25(c) (2012) (extending private rights of action in options in various
financial contracts, including swaps).
80
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need to give the Dodd-Frank amendments to the CEA their full
effect and permit individual plaintiffs to assert private rights of
action in court. Finally, the Second Circuit needs to address the
shortcomings of the Loginovskaya decision to curtail further
confusion.
III. REVIVING A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO INTERPRETING
EXTRATERRITORIAL CLAIMS ASSERTED UNDER THE CEA
A.

Courts Should Not Extend Morrison in the Commodities and
Derivatives Context

Although securities law analyses have often been
analogously extended to commodity claims in the past,84
Morrison’s transactional test and presumptions against
extraterritoriality should not be extended to commodity claims,
and courts should return to a more holistic analysis in
determining whether a court has jurisdiction over a claim. This
idea has been alluded to in several instances, including by the
Southern District in the initial Loginovskaya decision,85 and by
the concurring justices in the Morrison decision.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, focused on the importance of a flexible method and
argued that “while the Court devotes a considerable amount of
attention to the development of case law . . . it draws the wrong
conclusions [here].”86 “The text and history of § 10(b) are
famously opaque on the question of when, exactly, transnational
securities frauds fall within the statute’s compass.”87 Therefore,
while Scalia’s bright-line rule “makes for a nice catchphrase, the
point is overstated.”88 Best stated, “[t]he presumption against
84
See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1044 (2d Cir. 1983) (“In
construing the reaches of jurisdiction under the CEA, courts have analogized to
similar problems under the securities laws which have been more extensively
litigated.”). Note that this was at the time of courts using the “conducts” and
“effects” test, which is more appropriately suited for a commodities claim analysis.
85
Loginovskaya I, 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
86
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 278 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 278–79 (“[T]he Court seeks to transform the presumption from a
flexible rule of thumb into something more like a clear statement rule. . . .”).
87
Id. at 274; id. at 276 (“[T]he Court’s critique of the decision below for applying
‘judge-made rules’ is quite misplaced [because] [t]his entire area of law is replete
with judge-made rules, which give concrete meaning to Congress’ general
commands.”).
88
Id. at 280.
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extraterritoriality can be useful as a theory of congressional
purpose, a tool for managing international conflict, a background
norm, a tie breaker. It does not relieve courts of their duty to
give statutes the most faithful reading possible.”89 The Court’s
real question in Morrison was addressing “how much, and what
kinds, of domestic contacts were sufficient to trigger the
application of § 10(b)” of the Exchange Act, and that is where
Morrison’s application should end.90
While there certainly are critical underlying differences
between securities and derivative products, the regulatory
regimes governing each, especially following the enactment of
Dodd-Frank, are quite similar.91 Dodd-Frank amended the
language of both the CEA as well as the ’34 Exchange Act.92 The
language in both of the acts has led to a widespread divide
among courts in interpreting how Morrison should now apply,
but it seems clear that Congress included this language in both of
the acts to clarify the reach of Dodd-Frank and address its
disagreement with the Morrison Court.93
Under the amended language of the ’34 Exchange Act,
Morrison should be less relevant in the securities context than it
still is, as it was meant to be overridden by the statutory
language. Courts have long understood the importance of
plaintiffs being able to bring a private right of action,94 and over
time, it seems that courts have begun to experience and
understand the post-Dodd-Frank challenges associated with
using the Morrison test.95

89
Id.; id. at 285 (“[W]hile the clarity and simplicity of the Court’s test may have
some salutary consequences, like all bright-line rules it also has its drawbacks.”).
90
Id. at 281.
91
See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, 1672 (2010).
92
Id.
93
Jonathan E. Richman, Proskauer Rose Discusses the SEC’s Extraterritorial
Reach, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 11, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu
/2017/04/11/proskauer-rose-discusses-the-secs-extraterritorial-reach/ (“The Morrison
decision was announced on June 24, 2010. On July 21, 2010—less than one month
later—President Obama signed the 850-page Dodd-Frank Act . . . .”)
94
See Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007)
(“This Court has long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal
antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and
civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).”).
95
See supra note 46.
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Therefore, because of the intended effect of the Dodd-Frank
amendments to the CEA and the ’34 Exchange Act and the fact
that the Morrison test cannot be consistently applied and used in
its intended securities context,96 it should follow that the test
cannot be consistently applied and should not be used in the
commodities and derivatives context.
B.

The Importance of Affording Foreign Plaintiffs a Private
Right of Action

Dodd-Frank unwound the broad exemption from OTC
derivatives regulation provided by the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act and substituted a complex regulatory
framework by dividing the market into “swaps” to be primarily
regulated by the CFTC, and “security-based swaps” to be
primarily regulated by the SEC, and “mixed swaps.”97 The
definition of “swap” is not exactly straightforward.98 Due to the
complexity and diversity of swaps and other derivatives, it is
easy to see how fraud, though not physically taking place on U.S.
soil, could easily disrupt the domestic and international markets.
This volatility, partnered with the sheer size of the industry
alone, is a leading reason why § 22 of the CEA exists and why we
should allow plaintiffs to exercise private rights in situations
where they may have been defrauded. While critics may argue
that permitting foreign plaintiffs to gain access to U.S. courts
will open litigation floodgates and overwhelm the court system,
when balancing the interests of preserving an interdependent
system, this interest should outweigh procedural hurdles.
Similar balancing and interdependent policy arguments can
be seen outside of the derivatives context in bankruptcy cases.
For example, § 109(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code
articulates that in order to be eligible to file in the United States,
the debtor must either be domiciled, have a place of business, or
property in the United States.99 Foreign debtors that are neither
domiciled nor operate a business in the United States are
permitted to file and reap the benefits of the United States’
96

See supra note 46.
See KALBAUGH, supra note 5, at 71–72, 78–89 .
98
See id. at 73 (fig.3-B: Swap Definition); see also Commodity Exchange Act,
7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2012); Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP to
Clients, supra note 8.
99
11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
97
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system, even where their property in the United States is
something as minimal as $194 in a bank account.100 Similarly,
Bankruptcy Courts have attempted to extend the Morrison test
to bankruptcy claims and, like in commodity cases, reached
inconsistent
decisions
on
the
Code’s
extraterritorial
applicability.101 This Note does not suggest that commodity fraud
claims should be treated like bankruptcy cases, but rather that
other legal contexts allow foreign plaintiffs to assert claims in
U.S. courts for the overall benefit of the system and these same
policy rationales should be considered in this context.
In addition to this practical policy argument, it would be
highly inefficient to narrowly constrain a plaintiff’s ability to
bring a private right of action under the CEA. In lieu of allowing
potentially wronged plaintiffs to exercise, and likely settle, their
claims with a commodity broker, this would require that
enforcement gap to be filled by the CFTC—an already
underfunded and overstretched agency.
As noted by the CFTC Chairman, Timothy Massad, in light
of Dodd-Frank’s changes, “the CFTC’s budget has not kept pace
with its expanded role and market growth.”102 “The traditional
markets overseen by the Commission—that is, the futures and
options markets—are vastly different today than when the
Commission was established 40 years ago or even five years ago.
They have grown dramatically in size, technological
sophistication and complexity.”103 To understand the full scope of
its jurisdiction, consider the following from the 2015 Strategic
Plan:

100
See In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 38 (Bankr. De. 2000)
(citing In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 429 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996)) (holding that the
debtor corporation, headquartered in Athens, Greece, was eligible to file bankruptcy
in the United States because it had funds in a bank account here).
101
Compare In re Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 480 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2012) (concluding that Congress expressed a clear intention that § 550 of the
Bankruptcy Code should apply extraterritorially), with In re Madoff Sec., 513 B.R.
222, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Nothing in [the] language [of § 550] suggest[ed] that
Congress intended for this section to apply for foreign transfers,” and that the
presumption against extraterritoriality had not been rebutted).
102
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: FISCAL
YEAR 2017, supra note 23. Similarly, the SEC has not kept pace with its expanded
role and is only about halfway through with its mandated rulemaking.
103
Id. at 2.
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[T]he CFTC regulates a futures and options industry that
increased from 580 million contracts in 2000 to more than 3.1
billion contracts in 2010. The value of customer funds held in
Futures Commission Merchants Accounts, during the same
period, increased from $56.7 billion to more than $170.1 billion,
and the value of these contracts is notionally estimated at $40
trillion. . . . [W]ith the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
CFTC is [now] tasked with regulating the swaps markets with
an estimated notional value of approximately $300 trillion—
roughly eight times the size of the regulated futures markets.104

Though there have been increases to the CFTC’s budget over
time, these increases have not sufficiently helped the agency
carry out its expanded responsibilities.105 In fact, the CFTC’s
budget did not increase from 2015 to 2016.106 As a result of these
inevitable constraints, one of the biggest drawbacks noted by the
Commission is the crux of this argument: “The Commission
cannot engage in the necessary level of market surveillance, risk
surveillance and oversight, and enforcement efforts. This places
customers, the market, and by extension the U.S. economy at
increased risk of fraud, abusive practices and manipulation.”107
Given these limitations and the scope of the market it
regulates, limiting private rights of action afforded under the
CEA would only increase the overall burden on the CFTC and
work counterintuitively against this goal. An aggrieved plaintiff
will always have the option of bringing its allegations to and
seeking a remedy through the Commission,108 but to make this
their sole option for recovery would undercut the mission of both
the Commission and the CEA itself.
Courts have generally affirmed the CFTC’s power to engage
in rulemaking under Title VII and determine the extraterritorial
scope of those rules,109 and the Commission itself has also
recognized the need for private rights of action to supplement its

104
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2011–
2015, at 6 (2011), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/20
15strategicplan.pdf (emphasis added).
105
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: FISCAL
YEAR 2017, supra note 23, at 4.
106
Id. at 10 tbl.1.
107
Id. at 3.
108
See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a)–(c) (2012); 7 U.S.C. § 18(a)(1) (2012).
109
See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass'n v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 384 (D.D.C. 2014).
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jurisdiction to support its mission.110 Considering all of these
factors, courts should permit plaintiffs to exercise private rights
of action in U.S. courts to preserve the integrity of the
international derivatives markets and to give both the CEA and
Dodd-Frank their full effect.
C.

Clarifying Loginovskaya Will Help Preserve Market Integrity

The last step in untangling the web of extraterritorial
confusion is determining how to correct previous missteps of the
court. The CFTC advised the Second Circuit that its opinion in
Loginovskaya, if not corrected, would likely sow confusion.111
However, a simple timeline breakdown may reveal a way for the
decision to make sense in an isolated circumstance.
The fraud in Loginovskaya took place between 2006 and
2010, Morrison was decided in June 2010, and Dodd-Frank,
amending the relevant provisions of the CEA addressed in the
decision, was enacted in July 2010. If the Second Circuit’s
statement and analysis meant that the CEA did not apply
extraterritorially at the time of the fraud, the court needed to
make that assumption explicitly clear. By making these unclear
statements in its July 2014 decision, other courts have taken the
Second Circuit’s statements at face value. This unclear language
will not only continue to confuse courts, but will also continue to
confuse future plaintiffs trying to determine whether they can
assert a claim under the CEA in a U.S. court, ultimately blocking
their access to the court system and barring them from bringing
legitimate claims. Therefore, this error should be remedied, at a
110
“Private rights of action have been instrumental in helping to protect market
participants and deter bad actors. These actions can also augment the limited
enforcement resources of the CFTC, and serve the public interest by allowing
harmed parties to seek damages in instances where the Commission lacks the
resources to do so on their behalf.” Timothy Massad, Chairman, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, Statement in Support of the Proposed Amendment to the RTOISO Order (May 10, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
massadstatement051016 (advocating for the Commission’s proposal to expressly
preserve the right of private litigants to sue utilities, power producers, marketers
and other market participants for fraud and manipulation resulting from certain
transactions); J. Christopher Giancarlo, Commissioner, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, Statement of Dissent on the Proposed Amendment to the RTO-ISO Order
(May 10, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/giancarlostate
ment051016 (disagreeing with the proposal but conceding that “private claims may
serve the public interest by empowering injured parties to seek compensation for
damages where the Commission lacks the resources to do so on their behalf”).
111
See supra note 73.
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minimum, by amending the opinion to specify that the Court
considered the language of the CEA as it existed during the
relevant pre-Dodd-Frank fraud period in the facts of the case.112
Congress’s intent of protecting both markets and individuals
has been recognized through the enactment of Dodd-Frank and
the amending of the CEA. This intent has been echoed by both
the SEC and the CFTC and is consistent with the agencies’
rulemaking and governance.
It is important that courts
accurately interpret and reflect these goals and the appropriate
statutory mechanisms to achieve them.
CONCLUSION
If Ludmila Loginovskaya was defrauded by Thor Entities
tomorrow, and the Second Circuit correctly interpreted the
language of the CEA in a post-Dodd-Frank world, the difference
of her residing on Main Street, U.S.A. or Sutton Place, New York,
rather than in Surgut, Russia would have been immaterial. She
would have had her day in court. “[P]rivate rights of action were
called for by Congress under the CEA, to ensure wronged parties
were provided with an appropriate remedy . . . . Our job is to
ensure that determination is properly implemented and
enforced.”113
By eliminating the use of the Morrison test and returning to
a holistic, fact-specific approach in assessing extraterritorial
commodity claims, both private plaintiffs, foreign and domestic,
and the CFTC will be permitted to bring a cause of action for
commodities fraud under the CEA. More specifically, permitting
foreign plaintiffs to bring private causes of action in the United
States will allow for all three branches of government to work
towards the common goal of preserving the integrity of both the
domestic and international derivatives markets, and the
individuals who seek to participate in those markets.

112
113

See supra note 68.
Massad, supra note 110.

